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Quantum key distribution performs the trick of growing a secret key in two distant places connected by a
quantum channel. The main reason is so that the legitimate users can bound the information gathered by the
eavesdropper. In practical systems, whether because of finite resources or external conditions, the quantum channel
is subject to fluctuations. A rate-adaptive information reconciliation protocol, which adapts to the changes in the
communication channel, is then required to minimize the leakage of information in the classical postprocessing.
We consider here the leakage of a rate-adaptive information reconciliation protocol. The length of the exchanged
messages is larger than that of an optimal protocol; however, we prove that the min-entropy reduction is limited.
The simulation results, both in the asymptotic and in the finite-length regime, show that this protocol allows to
increase the amount of a distillable secret key.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.87.042334 PACS number(s): 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Shannon published his seminal “A Mathematical Theory of
Communications” [1] in 1948 after eight years of intermittent
work [2]. The paper meant the birth of communications and
coding theory. Shannon not only established the frame under
which communications systems could be studied and com-
pared; he also proved their fundamental limits, i.e., the limiting
rates for data compression and reliable transmission through
noisy channels. This second result was especially surprising
since there was no certainty that reliable transmission with a
positive rate was even possible [3].
A year later, in 1949, Shannon’s “Communication Theory
of Secrecy Systems” [4] came to light. In the words of
Gallager, “Shannon’s cryptography work can be viewed as
changing cryptography from an art to a science” [2]. Shannon
successfully applied the tools developed in [1] to the problem
of transmitting confidential messages through public channels.
His main conclusion is that a message from a set of messages
sent through a public channel can be obfuscated into a cypher
text with the help of a secret key in such a way that the number
of possible originating messages is the whole set of messages;
that is, the cypher text leaks no information to a possible
eavesdropper. The condition for this to happen is that the
number of secret keys is equal to or greater than the number of
messages. This condition only applies to eavesdroppers with
unbounded resources; if we limit the storage or computing
capability of the eavesdropper, secret communications are
possible without fulfilling the condition. It is evident that
computing power resources that today might be considered
out of reach might become available in the near future. There
is an implicit risk in assuming that an eavesdropper is limited
in any way beyond the fundamental limits that physics impose
upon her; therefore, the interest in establishing the scenarios
in which some kind of security can be achieved without any
assumption is self-evident.
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The distribution of secret keys or SKD is a problem closely
related to confidential communications. Two parties sharing a
secret key can communicate privately through a channel in the
conditions discussed in the previous paragraph. We can then
study the problem of secret-key sharing as a way to achieve
confidential communications. The main idea is that two distant
parties can agree in a secret key if they have access to a shared
source of randomness. The randomness source can take many
incarnations, e.g., in the form of a source received from a
trusted party or in the form of a noisy channel [5].
In most of the SKD scenarios the legitimate parties obtain
instances of correlated sources, which means that they obtain
similar but not identical strings. It is then assumed that there
is an authentic though otherwise public channel available
to all parties—including the eavesdropper. The legitimate
parties can exchange additional information through this
channel in order to reconcile their strings. They can do so
by revealing some information about them, for instance the
parities of carefully chosen positions. This process is known
as information reconciliation [6]. It is not hard to see that the
information exchanged through the public channel reduces
the uncertainty that the eavesdropper has on the strings of
the legitimate parties. Thus, a reduction in the leakage due
to information reconciliation allows to increase the amount
of the distillable secret key. A second step known as privacy
amplification is then needed [7]. In the privacy amplification
step the legitimate parties agree on a secret but shorter
key of which the eavesdropper has a negligible amount of
information.
These mathematical models can have a real (i.e., phys-
ical) correspondence. One such model is a physical fiber
carrying single photons randomly polarized in one of two
nonorthogonal bases [8]. Quantum key distribution (QKD)
is probably the main practical application of SKD. In a QKD
protocol [8–10], two legitimate parties, Alice and Bob, aim
at sharing an information theoretic secret key, even in the
presence of an eavesdropper Eve. In the quantum part of such
a protocol, Alice and Bob exchange quantum signals, e.g., sin-
gle photons, which carry classical information. For instance,
Alice encodes a classical bit onto the polarization or the phase
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of a photon and sends this photon to Bob, who measures it. In
any realistic implementation of a QKD protocol, the strings
obtained after the exchange of the quantum signals suffer
discrepancies mainly due to losses in the channel and noise in
Bob’s detectors but which are conservatively attributed to the
action of an eavesdropper. Therefore, any QKD protocol must
include the classical postprocessing steps described above in
order to extract a secret key from the correlated strings.
The channel connecting Alice and Bob in a real system may
substantially vary over time. The motivation of this work is
to analyze the sp protocol [11], an information-reconciliation
protocol that adapts to these channel variations. We previously
showed that in a classical repetition scenario (i.e., with
classical attackers and independent, identically distributed
sources) its reconciliation efficiency is only limited by the
quality of the error-correcting code used to implement the
protocol [12]. We consider here the leakage of the sp protocol
with a quantum eavesdropper, both in the asymptotic and in
the finite-length regime, and its impact on the amount of the
distillable secret key.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATION
Let X be a discrete random variable taking values in the
finite alphabet X . The Shannon entropy [1], min-entropy, and
max-entropy [13] of X are respectively defined by
H (X) = −
∑
x∈X
pX(x) log2 pX(x), (1)
H∞(X) = min
x∈X
[− log2 pX(x)], (2)
H0(X) = log2 |x ∈ X : pX(x) > 0|, (3)
where | · | stands for the cardinality of a set. It holds that
H∞(X)  H (X)  H0(X), and the equality occurs when the
outcomes in X are given by a uniform distribution.
Now let X and Y be two jointly distributed discrete random
variables taking values on alphabets X and Y , respectively.
The conditional entropy, min-entropy, and max-entropy of X
given Y are defined by
H (X|Y ) =
∑
y∈Y
H (X|y), (4)
H∞(X|Y ) = min
y∈Y
H∞(X|y), (5)
H0(X|Y ) = max
y∈Y
H0(X|y), (6)
where the entropy of a random variable given an event is the
entropy of the induced random variable.
Let the state of a finite-dimensional quantum system be
represented by a trace one, positive semidefinite operator on a
(finite-dimensional) Hilbert space H. We denote by P(H) the
set of all states acting on H.
Let us give some basic definitions about the quantum
counterparts of these classical information measures. The
equivalent of the entropy of a random variable is the von
Neumann entropy of a state ρX [14]. It is defined as
H (X)ρX = −tr(ρX log2 ρX), (7)
where tr denotes the trace operation and we indicate with
a subscript the state on which the entropy is computed.
Henceforth, it is explicitly written whenever it helps to clarify
a statement.
Let ρXY ∈ P(HX ⊗HY ) be a bipartite quantum state. The
conditional quantum min-entropy of ρXY given HY is defined
as
H∞(X|Y ) = sup
σY
(− log2 min{λ|λ idX ⊗ σY  ρXY }), (8)
where λ > 0.
If HY is one-dimensional,
H∞(X|Y ) = H∞(X) = − log2 λmax(ρX), (9)
where λmax(ρX) outputs the maximum eigenvalue of ρX.
We finally consider the smooth generalization of the condi-
tional min-entropy introduced in [15]. Let {ρ,σ } ∈ P(H); the
trace distance between ρ and σ is given by
1
2 ||ρ − σ ||1 = tr(|ρ − σ |). (10)
The smooth entropy was first defined as an optimization
over all states ε-close in terms of the trace distance. The smooth
entropies have been redefined in terms of other measures such
as the purified distance and verify additional properties [16,17]
but for the present study it suffices to consider the original
definition.
Let ρXY ∈ P(HX ⊗HY ) and ε  0. The smooth version of
Eq. (8) is given by
Hε∞(X|Y )ρXY = sup
ρˆXY
H∞(X|Y )ρˆXY , (11)
where the supreme is found over all ρˆXY such that 12 ||ρXY −
ρˆXY ||1  ε.
III. INFORMATION RECONCILIATION
A. Impact of information reconciliation on the secret key length
One common assumption in a SKD protocol is that all
the parties have access to the outcomes of an independent
identically distributed experiment repeated many times. If this
assumption holds, the parties can safely regard an average
behavior as the law of large numbers guarantees that the
joint outcome will be typical with high probability. However,
assuming a repetition scenario might be unrealistic in some
situations, in these cases key distillation can be considered for
a finite number of outcomes of a joint experiment. This second,
more restrictive, scenario is sometimes referred as finite-key
distillation. Both the repetition [10] and the finite-key [18–20]
scenarios have been addressed in QKD.
The secrecy of a key K can be measured in terms of its
closeness to a perfect one which is uniformly random and
decoupled from the eavesdropper’s system Z. A key K is
considered ε-secure if [21]
1
2 ||ρKZ − τK ⊗ ρZ||1  ε. (12)
The communications on the public channel might be one
way or two ways. We have chosen to restrict the channel to
one-way communications since our focus is on practical
protocols with reduced distillation complexity, network re-
quirements, etc. However, it should be noted that two-way
communications can be used to distill a key in scenarios
where one-way secret key distillation is not possible [5] and,
042334-2
ANALYSIS OF A RATE-ADAPTIVE RECONCILIATION . . . PHYSICAL REVIEW A 87, 042334 (2013)
in general, the amount of a distillable secret key with two-way
communications can be strictly higher than with one-way
communications [22,23].
In the repetition scenario and aided by one-way classical
communications, the maximum rate at which a key can be
extracted with ε approaching zero as the number of repetitions
goes to infinity is given by [24]
K = H (X|Z) − H (X|Y ), (13)
where X and Y are classical systems available to the legitimate
parties Alice and Bob and Z is a quantum system at the
eavesdropper’s site. The first term on the right-hand side of
Eq. (13) amounts to the randomness that can be extracted
which is independent of Z while the second term can be
regarded as the information that Alice and Bob should
exchange to reconcile X and Y .
Equation (13) is valid only in the asymptotic case. However,
a real system has only access to finite resources, which means
that not only do Alice and Bob have bounded computational
power but also they have to distill a secret key from a
finite number of experiments. Thus, in general there is no
convergence toward an ideal key and security has to be
considered for an acceptable security threshold ε.
Let us assume that Alice and Bob exchange N signals out
of which they use m for estimating their correlations and
t  N − m for key distillation. If the correlations do not
verify some conditions, Alice and Bob abort the protocol;
εPE represents the probability that the parameter estimation
procedure fails.
Given some reconciliation protocol, C stands for the set
of all possible reconciliation messages and εEC represents the
maximum probability that the estimate at Bob’s site does not
coincide with Alice’s string.
Let εPA represent the failure probability in the privacy
amplification procedure, and ε¯ is a smoothing parameter; then
the rate at which the legitimate parties can distill an ε-secure
key is bounded by [25]
Kε  1
N
(
Hε¯∞(Xt |ZNC) − 2 log2
1
εPA
)
, (14)
where ε = nPEεPE + εEC + εPA + ε¯, and nPE is the number of
estimated parameters.
The smooth min-entropy in Eq. (14) can be evaluated to
measure the net impact of information reconciliation [25]:
Hε¯∞(Xt |ZNC)  Hε¯∞(Xt |ZN ) − leak, (15)
where leak is a purely classical term that tracks the amount of
information correlated with Xt revealed during reconciliation.
It is given by [15]
leak = H0(C) − H∞(C|Xt ). (16)
The main effect of an imperfect reconciliation is a reduction
of the secret key rate, which in turn, in terms of the figures of
merit of a QKD protocol, limits the distance range over which
secret keys can be distilled [10,26].
B. Fundamental limits of information reconciliation
Let Alice and Bob be two parties holding x and y, two
n-length strings that are respectively n outcomes of two
jointly distributed random variables X and Y . A one-way
reconciliation protocol on the strings x and y is a protocol
that produces the strings sx and sy from x and y, respectively,
after exchanging the message c(x) through the public channel.
A reconciliation protocol is considered ε robust [6] if∑
x∈X n,y∈Yn
p(x,y)p(sx = sy)  ε. (17)
The efficiency of a reconciliation protocol can be measured
using a quality parameter ξε that compares the amount
of disclosed information with the minimum theoretical
disclosure:
ξε = leak
nH (X|Y ) , (18)
where the minimum nH (X|Y ) is known as the Slepian-Wolf
bound; it delimits the minimum rate for reliably describing
a source X to a distant party with access to side information
Y [27].
It is well known the appropriateness of (linear) error
correcting codes for the Slepian-Wolf problem [28]. In
consequence, good error-correcting codes can be used for
information reconciliation. Let C(n,k) be a linear code with
coding rate R0 = k/n; a message of length n − k called the
syndrome [29] can be used to reconcile two sources with
conditional entropy nH (X|Y ). Even if n − k is greater than
the theoretical minimum, for finite lengths there is always
nonzero error probability. We denote the rate of decoding
errors or frame error rate (FER) by the parameter ε. Then,
a reconciliation protocol based on sending the syndrome of
a linear code is ε robust, and the reconciliation efficiency is
given by
ξεC =
n − k
nH (X|Y ) =
1 − R0
H (X|Y ) . (19)
However, an acceptable FER in a communications protocol
might not be sufficient in a security context. It is a common
practice to divide the reconciliation process into two steps
[18,30]. In the first one, a common string is produced, for
instance using an error-correcting code as we just described.
In the second one, Alice uniformly at random chooses a
function f from a family of 2-universal hash functions [31]
and computes a hash of her string, f (sx). Alice sends to Bob
her choice f together with f (sx). Bob computes his own hash
value f (sy) and the protocol aborts if f (sx) = f (sy). Since
the choice of the hash function is independent of X, only the
length of the hash − log2 εEC for some εEC > 0 is added to
the leakage:
leakεECC = n(1 − R0) +
⌈
log2
1
εEC
⌉
. (20)
The joint reconciliation process is εEC robust where εEC can
be chosen to be much smaller than the FER.
It is clear from Eq. (19) that the length of the conversation
when using a code is fixed to n − k. That is, the amount of
information does not adapt to the error rate in the channel.
This is a perfect solution for the Slepian-Wolf problem since
the correlations are fixed and known beforehand. However, in
QKD it is common that the error rate varies from one execution
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to the next. In consequence, an adaptation of the coding rate
is needed in order to use linear codes for reconciliation.
IV. STUDY OF A RATE-ADAPTIVE PROTOCOL
In this section we study the efficiency and impact of a
rate-adaptive protocol, which is in essence the sp protocol
in [11] with an additional error-verification step.
A. Description of the rate-adaptive protocol
In the following we detail the steps of a rate-adaptive
information reconciliation protocol.
Step 0: Preconditions. Alice and Bob agree on the following
parameters: (i) a pool of shared mother codes of length n,
constructed for different rates; (ii) d, the maximum number
of symbols (bits) that will be used to adapt the coding rate;
and (iii) the target εEC which characterizes the length of the
hashes.
Step 1: Raw key exchange. Alice and Bob obtain two
correlated strings x and y, respectively, of length n − d and a
precise estimate of the error rate pe. If pe is outside their target
rates they abort the protocol. Otherwise, both parties select
the appropriate code C and compute the adequate number of
symbols (bits) s to reveal, with s < d, such that the coding
rate is then adapted to pe.
Step 2: Coding. Alice creates an extended string xˆ of length
n by concatenating x and x ′, a uniformly random string of
length d. Alice sends to Bob the hash value f (xˆ), the syndrome
of xˆ on C, and the values and positions of s symbols among
the d symbols randomly generated.
Step 3: Decoding. Bob creates an extended string of length
n by concatenating y and y ′, a uniformly random string of
length d. Bob sets the values of the received s symbols to their
correct value. Bob computes yˆ, his estimate of xˆ, and f (yˆ),
his own hash value. If f (yˆ) = f (xˆ) they abort the protocol.
We would like to remark that in step 2 both the verification
tag and the reconciliation message are jointly encoded and
sent to Bob. There is no extra interactivity coming from
error verification, still only one message is exchanged for
reconciliation, and a second one from Bob to Alice is sent
to notify the success or failure of the protocol.
B. Leakage
The sp protocol creates an extended system XtX′ by adding
d symbols (bits) with random values. The Slepian-Wolf bound
implies that for successful reconciliation the length of the
reconciliation message should be greater than
H (XtX′|Y t ) = H (Xt |Y t ) + d, (21)
which is trivially larger than H (Xt |Y t ) if d > 0.
However, the appropriate comparison is in terms of the
conditional smooth entropy on the reconciled system, since
it is the magnitude that limits the distillable key after the
reconciliation step. Lemma 1 shows that the smooth min-
entropy decrease produced by the sp protocol on the extended
system is equivalent to the decrease produced by an error-
correcting code with rate R on the original system. This
equivalent coding rate R is given by
R = k − s
n − d . (22)
The dependence of R on d and s allows to understand how
the protocol adapts the amount of information disclosed for
reconciling errors. Since the value of d is fixed previous to
the execution of the protocol, it is s, the number of symbols
(bits) revealed to Bob on the public channel and the parameter
available to Alice for modulating the coding rate. A higher
value of s increases the information available to the decoder,
allowing him to reconcile noisier strings, while a lower value
of s allows him to reduce the leakage by increasing the
coding rate. On the other hand, d sets the range of achievable
rates, from (k − d)/(n − d) to k/(n − d). The extremal values
correspond to the limiting cases of revealing the d symbols
(bits) and revealing no information on the public channel.
Lemma 1. Let ρXtZN be a bipartite state and σXtX′ZNC the
extension resulting from the application of the sp protocol.
Then the smooth min-entropy of the extended system XtX′
given ZNC can be bounded by
Hε∞(XtX′|ZNC)σ  Hε∞(Xt |Z)ρ − t(1 − R) −
⌈
log2
1
εEC
⌉
.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 1 follows:
Hε+ε
′
∞ (XtX′|ZNC)σ  Hε+ε
′
∞ (XtX′|ZN )σ − leak
= Hε+ε′∞ (XtX′|ZNI )φ − leak
 Hε∞(Xt |ZN )φ + Hε
′
∞(X′|I )φ − leak.
Let ε′  0. The first inequality follows from Eq. (15) which
bounds the impact of the conversation. We can trivially
extend the state on σXtX′ZN to φXtX′ZNI = σXtX′ZN ⊗ idI ,
where I is a one-dimensional system, without changing
the value of the smooth min-entropy [Hε+ε′∞ (XtX′|ZN )σ =
Hε+ε
′
∞ (XtX′|ZNI )φ]; the first equality holds by this argument.
We can apply Renner’s superadditivity theorem in [15] for
product states to obtain the second inequality. If we now
consider just the second and third terms from this last relation,
we obtain
Hε
′
∞(X′|I )φ − leak
= (s + p) −
(
s + n(1 − R0) +
⌈
log2
1
εEC
⌉)
= −t(1 − R) −
⌈
log2
1
εEC
⌉
.
We can choose ε′ = 0 and since I is one-dimensional
H∞(X′|I )φ reduces to H∞(X′)φ . Furthermore, X′ is classical
and uniformly distributed, thus maximizing the min-entropy.
The leakage is obtained by tracking the amount of information
sent from Alice to Bob during the protocol and subtracting the
part that is independent of XtX′. We recover the desired result
if we consider that φXtX′ZNI is also an extension of ρXtZN ,
which means that Hε∞(Xt |ZN )φ = Hε∞(Xt |ZN )ρ . 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section we compare the tradeoffs between using the
sp protocol, nonadapted error-correcting codes, and Cascade
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FIG. 1. The asymptotic leakage of the sp protocol, the leakage of
Cascade, and the leakage for a perfect reconciliation procedure are
compared as a function of the QBER.
(a well-known interactive protocol proposed in [6] and
implemented in most QKD systems). First we present the dif-
ference of the reconciliation protocols in terms of asymptotic
leakage and then we plug them into a QKD protocol and
compare the distillable secret key with finite resources.
The strings are assumed to be binary and are modeled as the
input and output of a binary symmetric channel (BSC). This
is appropriate in the case of some QKD protocols [8,32,33] if
errors on the quantum channel are symmetric and independent.
For convenience, we have implemented the rate-adaptive
sp protocol with irregular binary low-density parity-check
(LDPC) codes since there is a wealth of material and informa-
tion available: a number of matrices, decoding algorithms, and
communication standards have been proposed in the past years
for these codes. However, nonbinary LDPC codes [34] or other
code families [35] could probably be adapted to implement the
sp protocol. We fixed the proportion of modulated symbols to
d/n = 5%.
Figure 1 shows the leakage rate (leakεECC /t) as a function
of the quantum bit error rate (QBER). An optimal protocol
achieving the Slepian-Wolf bound (solid line) is compared
to the asymptotic sp protocol computed using the theoretical
analysis described in Appendix B (dashed line) and to Cascade
(dotted line). Note that for Cascade, instead of upper bounding
the leakage with the analytical estimate given in [6] which
might be overly pessimistic, we used as the upper bound the
leakage rate with large blocks of length 106 (see Appendix A
for numerical justification).
Both Cascade and the sp protocol are close to optimal for
small QBERs. However, over approximately 3% they begin to
diverge and while the former closely follows the Slepian-Wolf
bound the latter clearly has a higher leakage.
To analyze the impact of reconciliation on the achievable
secret key rate, we have chosen the prepare and measure a
version of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol and
consider for simplicity, and in order to highlight the effect
of reconciliation, an idealized scenario: we assume that Alice
and Bob have access to single-photon sources and perfect
detectors. Following [36] the secret key in this setting can be
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Secret key rate in the finite-key regime for a
perfect reconciliation procedure, the sp protocol, and considering the
efficiency of Cascade. Three different QBER values are considered
(from left to right): 4% (blue), 5% (green), and 6% (red). Other
parameters are ε = 10−5 and εEC = 10−10.
distilled at a rate
Kε  t
N
{[1 − h(Q)] − 	(t) − leak/t}, (23)
where h is the binary entropy function, Q is the estimated
QBER that takes into account statistical fluctuations due to
the finite-length case, and 	 is the smoothing parameter that
allows us to lower bound the smooth min-entropy in Eq. (14)
[25].
Figure 2 shows the secret key rate as a function of the
number of exchanged signals (N ). We compare in this figure
the secret key rate for three different QBER values (4%, 5%,
and 6%) using a perfect reconciliation protocol, Cascade, and
the sp protocol. The security parameter ε is set to 10−5, and
εEC = 10−10, as suggested in [36].
The convergence of LDPC codes towards the asymptotic
value is slower than that of Cascade (see Appendix A). In
consequence the optimality of the distillable key with this
implementation of the sp protocol increases with the length,
shifting from close to Cascade for small lengths to close to
the optimal value asymptotically. For low QBERs and small
lengths, the slow convergence of LDPC codes together with
the good efficiency of Cascade in this region makes both secret
key rates very similar. For higher QBERs, even for small
lengths the LDPC implementation of the sp protocol clearly
outperforms Cascade.
VI. DISCUSSION
This paper analyzes some improvements in the classical
postprocessing of QKD protocols. The key distillation process
can be divided into two steps: information reconciliation and
privacy amplification. Information reconciliation allows to
establish a common string and in the privacy-amplification step
a shorter but more secure key is created. Both steps are highly
coupled: in essence every bit exchanged in the information-
reconciliation step implies that one additional bit has to be
removed from the final key in the privacy-amplification step.
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The problem of correcting the discrepancies between the
strings of the legitimate parties is also known as the problem
of source coding with side information by the information
theory community. Under this paradigm, the theoretical limits
of information reconciliation are given by the Slepian-Wolf
bound. Information reconciliation is, then, basically error
correction.
We have adopted a pragmatic approach towards error
correction and used modern coding techniques well suited for
QKD purposes. In a real QKD scenario we have to deal with
a broad range of error rates. Furthermore, the number of times
the classical public communication channel is accessed should
be limited. As opposed to the eavesdropper that should, for the
sake of security, be assumed to have access to unbounded
resources, the legitimate parties are equipped with a finite
amount of resources.
The sp protocol, induced by a mother code of rateR0, allows
the legitimate parties to adapt the reconciliation step to varying
conditions. However, it exchanges a message longer than the
optimal one. We proved that the sp protocol is equivalent to
the use of a code with an adapted rate R. The claim holds in
the sense that the smooth min-entropy reduction of the former
in an extended system is bounded by the reduction of the latter
in the original system.
We implemented the sp protocol with irregular LDPC
codes. The results obtained indicate that the sp protocol
asymptotically behaves close to the theoretical limit. We claim
no optimality in our implementation of the sp protocol and
certainly it could be expected that other code families are better
suited to short key lengths or to other kinds of correlations
different from those modeled by a BSC. The analysis, however,
applies to any linear error-correcting code. In consequence, it
allows us to consider rate-adaptive information reconciliation
as a specific code design problem. We believe that this protocol
opens the doors to consider simpler and possibly better
schemes for classical postprocessing in secret key distillation
protocols.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work has been partially supported by the project
Quantum Information Technologies in Madrid (QUITEMAD),
Project No. P2009/ESP-1594, and the CHIST-ERA project
Composing Quantum Channels, Project No. PRI-PIMCHI-
2011-1071.
APPENDIX A: CASCADE SIMULATIONS
In order to estimate the asymptotic leakage of Cascade we
simulated the protocol with strings of lengths 104, 105, and
106. The results in Table I show that with a string length of
106 the leakage rate has already converged.
TABLE I. Leakage rate of Cascade for strings of length 104, 105,
and 106 as a function of the QBER.
QBER 104 105 106
0.01 0.0917 0.0914 0.0914
0.04 0.285 0.284 0.284
0.05 0.338 0.338 0.338
0.06 0.390 0.390 0.390
APPENDIX B: THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF
RATE-MODULATED CODES
Binary linear codes admit a bipartite graph representation
in which symbols are linked with parity checks. An ensemble
of irregular binary LDPC codes can be defined by the degree
distributions on the edges of symbols and checks [37]. We can
study the behavior of an ensemble under a message-passing al-
gorithm by tracking the evolution of the message distributions.
This recursive tracking is known as density evolution [37]
and allows us to compute the asymptotic decoding threshold
of a code family on a communications channel. In general,
densities are updated following this recurrence relation:
p
+1(x) = ρ(p0(x) ∗ λ(p
(x))), (B1)
where p
 is the average probability on symbols on the
decoding iteration 
 if the code graph is treelike, λ(x) and
ρ(x) are the symbol and check node degree polynomials,
respectively, p0(x) is the initial message density, and ∗ stands
for convolution.
In Sec. V, we focused our attention on the BSC. This
channel is characterized by a single parameter: the crossover
probability ε. That is, a bit is either noiselessly transmitted with
probability 1 − ε or flipped with probability ε. The channel is
then modeled by the following initial density distribution:
p0(x) = ε	L(ε)(x) + (1 − ε)	−L(ε)(x), (B2)
where L(ε) = log2 ε1−ε is a log-likelihood ratio, and 	t (x) =
δ(x − t) is the Dirac δ function displaced at position t .
Now, in the sp protocol, an n-length raw string is composed
of n − d bits sent through a noisy channel, in this case the
above-described BSC, and d bits with randomly assigned
values out of which s are revealed through the public and
noiseless channel. Letting σ and π stand for the fraction of
bits that are completely known and unknown to the decoder,
respectively, we can compute the asymptotic behavior of the
sp protocol with the following initial density:
p0(x) = (1 − π − σ )[ε	L(ε)(x) + (1 − ε)	−L(ε)(x)]
+π	0(x) + σ	∞(x). (B3)
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